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I nam a t c h i n gm o d e lo fﬁrm formation with moral hazard, we characterize the equilibrium
for economies with scarcity of capital and study the eﬀects of redistributive taxation. We give
necessary and suﬃcient conditions determining the equilibrium matching patterns, payoﬀs
and interest rate. These depend only on aggregate wealth and the median wealth relative
to the active population, compared to setup costs and technological parameters. We conﬁrm
previous results (see [2]), showing that monotonic job specialization typically obtains when
incentives are asymmetric within ﬁrms. Redistributive taxation now propagates its eﬀects
through the asset market and there may wealth nonmonotonic interest groups over median
changes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we study the interaction between occupational choices made in frictionless com-
petitive markets, the return to capital, and wealth distribution and redistributions. We extend
previous endogenous matching models of ﬁrm1 formation with moral hazard (e.g., Chakraborty
and Citanna [2]) to allow for economies where there is an endogenous interest rate.
There are at least two reasons to study the problem of matching with an endogenous
interest rate. The ﬁrst relates to the political economy of redistributions. With a ﬁxed
interest rate it was found that redistributive taxes on capital had monotonic eﬀects on class
w e l f a r e( s e e[ 2 ] ,P r o p o s i t i o n5 ) . W e a l t h classes below the median would beneﬁt, and those
above the median would lose from a redistributive policy which increases the median wealth
of the population, and vice versa. This result suggests that two-party Downsian electoral
competition on redistributive taxation would promote median-increasing policies of wealth
redistribution. Redistributions would go in the direction of the middle classes, echoing past
results by Romer [18], Roberts [17] and Meltzer and Richard [12]. However, the evidence
on middle classes determining the outcome of political competition is debated (see Persson
and Tabellini ([13], Ch. 7) for a survey). Is it still true that middle classes determine the
direction of redistributive programs when there are repercussions on the interest rate? The
second reason is purely theoretical. We want to know whether any of the results on matching
patterns obtained under excess supply of capital holds true when there is scarcity of aggregate
capital.
We consider economies with a large number of risk-neutral individuals identiﬁed by their
wealth, or capital endowment. Individuals have access to a stochastic production technology
by forming matches, or ‘ﬁrms’. Production is subject to a two—sided moral hazard problem
with limited transferability of utilities. Contracts within a match specify a deterministic
allocation of jobs2 to the parties and a distribution of the gains, taking as given what the
parties may earn in other matches. Individuals and ﬁrms also have access to perfect credit
markets where they can borrow or lend money at a riskfree rate.
In equilibrium, for each type, the expected gain from matching is determined endogenously
to guarantee equality of demand and supply of jobs. What each individual achieves within a
1We will use interchangeably the terms ‘match’, ‘ﬁrm’ or ‘partnership’: in our model, they identify the
same concept.
2That is, incentive symmetric or asymmetric ‘roles’, or ‘occupations’, or ‘tasks’.
2ﬁrm is set to be equal to his “outside option”, i.e., the maximum of what can be achieved in
other ﬁrms or activities. Moreover, the interest rate is set to clear the credit market.
We constructively prove the existence of equilibrium. As with an exogenous interest rate,
due to the limited transferability problem, monotonic job specialization typically obtains.
Individuals are separated along the occupational dimension, with richer individuals choosing
the occupation that is more incentive—intensive.
The general eﬀect of scarcity of capital is to reduce the size of the productive sector.
Compared to an economy with an excess supply of funds, individuals have to be richer for
production to be worthwhile. The equilibrium interest rate is lower than in a ﬁr s tb e s tw o r l d
and equals the return from production of the match generating the lowest surplus. This
surplus is determined by the wealth of the median type relative to the active population,a l s o
determined by looking at the ratio of aggregate wealth to setup cost. Thus, the equilibrium
distribution of occupations and utilities as well as the interest rate depend on the distribution
of wealth.
Redistribution programs only matter for equilibrium if they aﬀect the type equilibrium
utilities, that is, if they change the median of the active population. Even though the equilib-
rium is constrained Pareto optimal, these policies aﬀect aggregate surplus not only by changing
the proportions of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms in the economy, but also by changing the contracts,
utilities and surplus attained in those ﬁrms. Trickle down eﬀects can still be produced by
policies changing the median wealth, as shown in Section 5. The interplay between the labor
and the credit markets shows up in the transmission mechanism of wealth redistributions.
With scarcity of capital, changes in wealth distribution aﬀect individuals based on their posi-
tion on the credit market —depending on whether they are borrowers or lenders. On the other
hand, their position on the credit market depends on their occupation. Given monotonic job
specialization, in general lenders can be poor and rich as well. The initial wealth distribu-
tion matters for the direction of change, and the direction of median-changing redistributive
programs no longer necessarily reﬂects the preferences of the middle class.
Our model rests on the limited transferability assumption that arises both from the pres-
ence of ex—post limited liability constraints as well as from the absence of ex—ante transfers
using random job assignment schemes or lotteries within the match. Other matching mod-
els (see, e.g., Legros and Newman [10], [11], Shimer and Smith [21], Prescott and Townsend
[15]) put no restrictions on these lotteries, and assume that production is symmetric without
3loss of generality. Such lotteries necessarily do not satisfy role-contingent participation con-
straints, and we study environments where these participation constraints must be satisﬁed,
making such lotteries useless in solving the transfer problem. These are environments where
the matching market is open until after the lottery outcome is known. Nonconvexities in job
training such as job-speciﬁc investments or intensive schooling make switching jobs costly and
eliminate job rotations as a practical way to implement lotteries. Generally, lack of long-term
commitment due to available outside options after skills for a job are acquired break down
the use of such lotteries.
Our equilibrium notion is linked to the f-core (for a deﬁnition, see Kaneko and Wooders
[9]), and is more closely related to the one used in search models, as in Shimer and Smith [2],
for example. We adapt the deﬁnition of a search equilibrium to economies where there are
no frictions in the matching market. Another modeling approach close to ours is club theory
(see, e.g., Cole and Prescott [3], Conley and Wooders [4], Ellickson et al. [5], and Prescott and
Townsend [15]). We share their interest for describing a decentralized market mechanism. We
extend the analysis to private information economies with moral hazard team problems and
with lack of commitment. Even though we limit the convexifying eﬀect of lotteries, we show
that the scope of competitive markets is still valid to attain constrained eﬃcient allocations,
along the lines ﬁrst sketched in the seminal paper by Prescott and Townsend [14]. Our results
on job specialization in the absence of credit market imperfections and their consequences for
redistributions are static. However, we conjecture that a dynastic version otherwise similar to
Galor and Zeira [7] (see also Banerjee and Newman [1]) can also be used as an alternative to
credit market imperfections for the creation of ‘country poverty traps’ in the macroeconomic
theory of growth and economic development.
2T h e m o d e l
Economies have two dates and no aggregate uncertainty. There is only one physical commod-
ity, which is consumed at time one.
There is a continuum of individuals, of Lebesgue measure one, and indexed by i ∈ [0,1]
(the population size is normalized to one). Individuals are risk neutral and diﬀer in their
time zero endowment of the physical commodity, their wealth level Wk.U s i n g a s t a n d a r d
construction, we let M : R+ → [0,1] be a distribution function. Let K ⊂ R+ be the support
4of M, assumed to be compact. If M is continuous, let µ(k) ≥ 0 be the density at k ∈ R+. If
M is discrete, that is, K ﬁnite, it is simply the probability of k.T h e nµ(k) is interpreted as
the measure of individuals of wealth level Wk,w i t hWk >W k0 if k>k 0. So we consider both
economies with a continuum or with a ﬁnite number of types. We think of M as the wealth
distribution of our economy, and note that
R
Kµ(k)=1 , 3 while LebK ≤ 1. We also denote ik
the i-th individual of wealth level or type k.
At time zero, a decentralized frictionless matching market is open. Each individual has the
option of engaging in a stochastic productive activity by matching with any other individual,
or to remain idle or self-employed. Individuals and ﬁrms also have access to ﬁnancial contracts.
Each match is made up of two partners labeled p and a, respectively. We let d(ik) ∈ D ≡
{{Pk0}k0∈K,{Ak0}k0∈K,I} be the occupational decision of individual ik, a Lebesgue measurable
function, where Pk denotes being a p—agent of any of the K types of a—agents, Ak denotes an a—
agent of any of the K types of p—agents, and I corresponds to being idle. Let µ : K×D → R+
be the product measurable function deﬁned as
µ(k,d)=Leb({ik ∈ [0,µ(k)] | d(ik)=d})
for each k ∈ K, d ∈ D, i.e., the Lebesgue measure of individuals of type k who make the
occupational decision d ∈ D. Then, µk(d) ≡ µ|{k}×D gives the measure of individuals of type
k who are in diﬀerent occupations, and set
R
D µk(d)=µ(k)f o ra l lk, a feasibility condition.4
We sometimes also use the notation µd(k) ≡ µ|K×{d}.
Upon matching, individuals decide a task allocation and how to share the stochastic output
X which will be produced through the exercise of unobservable eﬀort. Bargaining takes place
within the match, while the matching market stays open. Hence, individuals are free to switch
to other matches all throughout negotiations. Individuals make matching decisions based on
the reservation price of their labor input, or reservation utility, which is taken as given and
is assumed to be type-speciﬁc. Let U ≡ U(k),k∈ K (also denoted Uk), be the reservation
utility function. It acts as a price-like variable, as in other matching models (see, e.g., Shimer
and Smith [21]).
3In what follows, we adopt this sloppy but short and eﬀective notation for this and similar Lebesgue





4All statements regarding k and i can be taken to hold M-a.s. and Leb-a.e., unless otherwise stated.
Also note that properly speaking here d(ik) is a measurable selection from the individual occupational choice
correspondence.
5We suppose that forming a ﬁrm may entail a setup cost, C ≥ 0, which requires external
ﬁnancing if the combined wealth of the participants in the ﬁrm is less than C.
At time one, negotiations are over, production takes place, uncertainty gets resolved;
output is distributed across partners, and individuals consume after meeting their ﬁnancial
obligations.
Production The production technology yields a stochastic output X through the exer-





with c ≥ 1




X(2) with probability f(ep,e a,α)
X(1) with probability 1 − f(ep,e a,α)
where X(2) >X(1) ≥ 0a n d∆X ≡ X(2) − X(1) < 2c. The probability f has the form:
f(ep,e a,α)=αea +( 1− α)ep
where α ∈ [1/2,1] measures the degree of substitutability, and it represents a technological
constraint deﬁning the diﬀerence in occupation between being a p— a g e n to ra na—agent.
Self-employed individuals have access to an eﬃcient storage technology.
Financial contracts Perfect and complete hedging opportunities are generally impossi-
ble in the presence of moral hazard, as discussed in [8] and [16], among others, for idiosyncratic
and aggregate risks, respectively. Hence we will assume that (perfect and) incomplete ﬁnan-
cial contracts exist, by assuming that there is a riskfree asset, available to both ﬁrms and
individuals.5
An amount l (invested if l>0, borrowed otherwise) of the riskless asset yields a payoﬀ
equal to L(r,l)=rl,w h e r er>0 is a gross rate of interest, taken as given by both ﬁrms and
individuals.
5We assume that in-house contracts are not observable by ﬁnancial investors. Assuming the contrary allows
to have complete and perfect hedging for ﬁrms, but restricted participation must be imposed by banning
individuals from these contracts. This diﬀerence is not key for our result on equilibrium matching patterns.
6For a self-employed individual, ﬁnancial decisions boil down to whether to invest his wealth
in the riskfree asset or to carry it to time one through the storage technology. For individuals
forming ﬁrms, during bargaining ﬁnancial investment plans lF must be made, and ex ante
ﬁnancial responsibilities qp and qa must be assigned to the partners, with lF + C ≤ qp + qa.
For j = p,a, let lj and qj denote the wealth agent j invests in the ﬁnancial market and in the
ﬁrm, respectively, with lj+qj ≤ Wj. We assume that investment in the ﬁrm can only be made
if physical participation to the ﬁrm is chosen. This is in the spirit of the interpretation of ﬁrms
as partnerships. Let Wp and Wa bethep—a n da—agent initial wealth,with W ≡ (Wp,W a) ∈ R2.
The ﬁnancial decisions will determine W
f
j (r) ≡ L(r,lj),j= p,a,F,t h eﬁnal ﬁnancial wealth
of the p—, a—agent and the ﬁrm, respectively.
Since it is not feasible to start a ﬁrm unless individuals are able to pay back the amount







p (r) ≥ 0; (F1)
This implies that a match must produce positive expected surplus.
Bargaining The partners in a match have to specify a deterministic role allocation and
a sharing rule w = w(X). Here w is the a-agent’s share, while W
f
F +X−w(X)i st h ep-agent’s
share, by budget balance.
Individuals are assumed to be risk neutral and preferences over money and eﬀort are
assumed separable, so that
ua(w,ea,e p)=Wf




F(r)+E[X − w(X)|ep,e a] − c(ep)
are the agents ﬁnal utilities.
The sharing rule w is set to induce eﬀort provision, subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints
ea ∈ argmaxe0∈[0,1] ua(w,e0,e p)( ICa)
ep ∈ argmaxe0∈[0,1] up(w,ea,e 0)( ICp)
and the limited liability constraints
w(X)+Wf




p (r) ≥ 0( LLp)
7Let U =( Up,Ua) ∈ R2 be the partners’ reservation utilities in the matching market. Then
we let
F(W,r) ≡ {(Up,U a) ∈ R
2 | ∃w,ea,e p,:( LL),(IC)h o l d ,U j = uj(w,ea,e p)f o rj = p,a}
be the feasible set of utilities given wealth levels W and the interest rate r,a n dF(W, U,r) ≡
F(W,r) ∩ {(Up,U a) ≥ U }.Abargaining procedure B w i t h i nam a t c ha tt i m ez e r oi sag a m e
and a solution which picks
U(B,W,U,r)) ≡ (Up(B,W ,U,r),U a(B,W,U,r)) ⊂ F(W,U,r)
specifying a subset in the feasible set F(W,U,r).6 In what follows, we will assume that this
set is a singleton without loss of generality.
Deﬁnition 1 A bargaining procedure B is constrained eﬃcient if for all W,U,r there does
not exist U0 ∈ F(W,U,r) such that U0 ≥ U(B,U,W,r)), with at least one strict inequality.
Constrained eﬃciency is valued relative to the technological, ﬁnancial and informational
constraints, and limited liability. The take-it-or-leave-it procedure where the p—agent makes
an oﬀer, denoted B∗, will be shown to be constrained eﬃcient. In order to simplify the
exposition, we keep α and B constant across matches (the second restriction is not binding
when B is constrained eﬃcient, as shown in Proposition 1).
Equilibrium At time zero, individuals enter the matching and ﬁnancial markets. They
maximize their utility by choosing an occupation and a match, and their ﬁnancial investment.
Financial choices conditional on occupations are straightforward: as there is no consump-
tion at time zero and there is limited liability, the time zero budget constraint is
l(d)=Wk − q(d), for all d ∈ D and all k ∈ K
where q(d) ≡ 0i fd = I. Conditional on wanting to form a speciﬁc match, any way of splitting
ﬁnancial responsibilities within the ﬁrm is then seen to be equivalent up to relabeling of the
sharing rule. Hence, ﬁnancial investment is residual. Hereafter, we assume without loss of
generality that qa =0a n dqp = C,s ot h a t
6When this set is empty, we take U(B,W,U,r)) = rW. This is done to avoid meaningless equilibria where





p (r)=r(Wp − C)a n dW
f
F(r)=0 . (1)
Since asset trading is determined once occupations are, we will omit l(d)f r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of
equilibrium. Nevertheless, aggregate capital availability determines the interest rate to clear
markets, and aﬀects the individual matching opportunities.





rWk if d = I
Ua(B,W k0,W k,U k0,U k,r)i f d = Ak0
Up(B,W k,W k0,U k,U k0,r)i f d = Pk0
An economy will be parametrized by θ =( M,α,c,C,X) and a bargaining procedure B.
An equilibrium requires optimization and consistency of individual behavior with aggregate
ﬁgures. Moreover, given that the matching market is frictionless, we assume that the utilities
U will be determined in such a way that there is no surplus over outside options.7
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium for an economy θ with bargaining procedure B consists of an
array <U,µ,r>such that




(ii) (market clearing): for all k,k0 ∈ K










Wkµ(k),< 0 only if r =1 ( A M )
(iii) (no extra surplus) for all k ∈ K,U (k)=m a x d∈D Uk(d,U,r).
7Thus, unlike Rubinstein and Wolinski [20], or Gale [6], e.g., this paper is not about justifying the com-
petitive outcome through the detailed study of bargaining. Both the existence of a ﬁnite bargaining stopping
time (time one, for us) and the no extra surplus condition are assumed, and not derived as the outcome of
some speciﬁc bargaining procedure.
9Condition (ii) is the demand-equal-supply equivalent in this discrete goods economy, where
the second equation (AM) is asset market clearing.8







KµI(k)) is the number of ﬁrms formed in equilibrium, is no greater than
R
K Wkµ(k), the aggregate supply of capital. Note that min(
R
K Wkµ(k)/C,1/2)9 is the maxi-
mum feasible number of ﬁrms to be formed in equilibrium.
The interest rate r is set to guarantee enough supply of funds in the economy. There is
demand of funds when 2Wk − C<0f o rs o m ek for which µk(Ak0) > 0a n dk0 ≤ k.T h e nr
may have to adjust to allow for self-employed individuals to provide the needed capital.
We assume that r ≥ 1 since otherwise individuals would always prefer to carry wealth to
the future by using the storage technology. If
R
K Wkµ(k) >C / 2 then there is excess supply
of capital, (AM) holds with inequality, and r = 1. In this case, the economies behave as if
there was an inﬁnite amount of capital and an exogenous interest rate, as in [2]. In this paper
we concentrate on the case where there is scarcity of capital so that
R
KWkµ(k) <C / 2. The
knife-edge case where
R
K Wkµ(k)=C/2 will be ignored in the characterization analysis, as
there is always an equilibrium where the economy behaves as in the presence of excess supply.
We are interested in studying the equilibrium when bargaining is constrained eﬃcient. In
this case, the details of bargaining do not aﬀect the equilibrium set, an invariance proposition.
It is a consequence of part (iii) in Deﬁnition 2.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium outcome < (U,µ,r > is invariant to the choice of constrained
eﬃcient bargaining procedures B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
T h es e c o n dr e s u l tw ed e r i v ef r o mt h ec o n s t r a i n e de ﬃciency of bargaining is the constrained
eﬃciency of equilibrium.
Constrained optimality In order to evaluate the welfare properties of the equilibrium,
we look at the utility deriving from a feasible allocation of roles to types, or a matching,
8Conditions (i)-(iii) in Deﬁnition 2 correspond to condition (5) —the acceptance rule—, the deﬁnition of
acceptance set and equation (6) —Bellman equation—, respectively, for the search equilibrium deﬁn e di nS h i m e r
and Smith [21]. Our feasibility for µ(k,d) is their equation (1). The diﬀerence is that our outside option is
not the expected value of future search, since without matching frictions search occurs today.
9With abuse of notation, hereafter
R
K Wkµ(k)/C =+ ∞ when C =0 .
10given the bargaining restrictions (in particular the incentive and limited liability constraints,
and the role-contingent participation constraints). We allow for wealth transfers. A transfer
policy τ is any (measurable) transformation of one economy θ into another economy θτ with a
compact (though possibly diﬀerent) support of types and the same total wealth,
R
K Wkµ(k).10
The actual distribution constrains, through limited liability, the attainable utilities. How-
ever, the presence of the endogenous r means that some changes in ﬁnal wealth are possible
through the reallocation of the riskfree asset. Instead of including directly this reallocation,
we indirectly allow for such changes by imputing to each matching an interest rate as well as
a utility. This is done as follows.
Recall that an economy is parameterized by θ =( M,α,C). Let B, the bargaining proce-
dure, also be given.
Although individuals produce and consume the physical commodity at time one, it is
convenient to think of allocations as the number of individuals assigned to a given consumption
and production plan, rather than as vectors of commodities assigned to individuals. This is
consistent with other matching, or club theoretic, models (see, e.g., [3]).
Deﬁnition 3 An allocation µ for an economy θ is a measurable function µ : K×D → R+.







D µk(d)=µ(k) for all k.L e tM θ be the set of feasible allocations.
Let U(i)b et h e( Leb-measurable) map [0,1] 7−→ R associating a utility to each individual,
in the economy θ.





K Wkµ(k), then r = 1. This is a constraint taking into account that if feasibility holds as
strict inequality, the excess supply of funds is put into the storage technology.
The utility associated to each feasible allocation µ and a feasible r, U(µ,r), is deﬁned as
the map
(i,µ,r) ∈ [0,1] × Mθ × R 7−→ Ui(µ,r)
such that for all i,i0, of type k and k0, Ui(µ,r),U i0(µ,r) ∈ F(Wk,W k0,r)i fµ(k0,A k) > 0,
and Ui(µ,r)=rWk if µ(k,I) > 0. Note that in principle the function U(µ,r)m a yb ea
correspondence, as multiple utility proﬁles may be compatible with a given µ and r. Then, to
each feasible allocation µ and feasible interest rate r, an associated utility is U(i) ∈ U(µ,r).
10The policy τ is formally described in the proof of Proposition 2.
11Deﬁnition 4 For an economy θ, we say that a utility proﬁle U(i) is dominated if there exist
at r a n s f e rp o l i c yτ,a na l l o c a t i o nµ and an interest r, feasible for θτ, such that U0(i) ∈ U(µ,r)
and U0(i) ≥ U(i) for almost all i, with strict inequality for a positive measure of i.
Deﬁnition 5 An equilibrium allocation µ is constrained Pareto optimal for an economy θ if
its associated equilibrium utility is undominated.
We now state the optimality result.
Proposition 2 For any economy θ, if the bargaining procedure B is constrained eﬃcient, the
equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Section 5 we will further explore the eﬀects of wealth redistributions on welfare. Propo-
sition 1 allows us to focus on the take-it-or-leave-it game B∗ to study existence of equilibrium
and equilibrium matching patterns. An equilibrium exists for all constrained eﬃcient bar-
gaining procedures B if it exists for the take-it-or-leave-it game. Therefore, we choose the
take-it-or-leave-it game B∗ to characterize the equilibrium outcome.
3 The take-it-or-leave-it procedure B∗
In the take-it-or-leave-it procedure, the p-agent oﬀers the a-agent a sharing rule to maximize
his utility. The contract is then accepted or rejected by the a-agent. The contract has to
guarantee the a-agent at least a reservation utility of U11, in expected terms (the individual
rationality (IR) constraint).
For a given interest rate, the net (expected) surplus function and the (expected) payoﬀs
to the p—a n dt h ea—agent in the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining procedure B∗ are the same as
the ones obtained in [2] for an exogenous interest rate r = 1. The total surplus as a function
of the a-agent’s reservation utility is strictly increasing when the a-agent limited liability and
individual rationality constraints bind, with slope less than one. It is also ‘bell-shaped’.
Let ∆w ≡ w(2) − w(1). Let ep(∆w)a n dea(∆w)b et h eo p t i m a le ﬀorts derived from the
(IC) constraints and f(∆w) the induced probability of success, all continuous functions of
∆w.D e ﬁne
11In this section, U is a real scalar and not a function as in Section 2. No confusion should arise.
12ga(∆w) ≡ ∆wf(∆w) − c
ea(∆w)2
2




Here gp is the net gain to the p-agent, ga the net gain to the a-agent, and g is the net
surplus from the match, as a function of the sharing rule ∆w. It is easily checked that ga
is strictly increasing, and gp and g are globally concave reaching interior maximums at ∆wp
and ∆wg respectively, with ∆wp < ∆wg for all α. Furthermore, gp(∆wp) >g a(∆wp), and that
gp(∆wg) ≤ ga(∆wg)f o ra l lα, with the equality holding if and only if α = 1
2. For brevity, let
f Wf
p (r)=r(Wp − C)+X(1). The p-agent thus solves:
maxw(1),∆w f Wf
p (r)+gp(∆w) − w(1) s.t.
rWa + ga(∆w)+w(1) ≥ U (IR)
min[w(1),w(1) + ∆w] ≥− rWa (LLa)




Let ∆w∗(U,W,r) be the optimal sharing rule expressed as a function of U,W,r,a n dl e t
S(U,W,r) ≡ g(∆w∗(U,W,r)) be the optimal surplus.
Proposition 3 Let α ∈ [1/2,1] be given. Assume (F1) and rWa + f Wf
p (r)+ga(∆X) ≥ U.
Then the optimal surplus is well-deﬁned and has the following properties:
a) When U<g a(∆wp),t h e no n l y(LLa) binds, S(U,W,r)=g(∆wp).
b) When ga(∆wp) ≤ U<g a(∆wg),t h e n(LLa) and (IR) bind, so that ∂
∂US(U,W,r) ∈
(0,1).
c) When ga(∆wg) ≤ U ≤ f Wf
p (r)+rWa +ga(∆wg),o n l y(IR) binds, S(U,W,r)=g(∆wg).
d) When f Wf
p (r)+rWa +ga(∆wg) <U, then (IR) and (LLp) bind, and ∂
∂US(U,W,r) < 0.
Proof. Omitted.12
An interpretation is found in [2] for r =1 , and carries over to the general case. The
optimal solution yields the following (expected) payoﬀst ot h ep-agent and the a-agent:
12For details, see A. Chakraborty and A. Citanna, “Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution”,
HEC C.R. 682 - 1999, or go to the web page, http://campus.hec.fr/profs/citanna.
13Ua(U,W,r)=m a x [ U,ga(∆wp)] (2)
Up(U,W,r)=f W
f
p (r)+rWa + S(U,W,r) − Ua(B
∗,U,W ,r)( 3 )
Choosing Up = Up(U,W,r)a n dUa = U,w eh a v et h a t( Up(U,W,r),U a(U,W,r)) = U(B∗,W ,U,r).
Using ∂
∂US(U,W,r) < 1w es e et h a tB∗ is constrained eﬃcient.
4 Characterization of equilibrium
We characterize the equilibrium allocation as a function of M,a l s op r o v i d i n gad i r e c ta n d
constructive proof of existence of our equilibria. Essentially, we will establish conditions on
the primitives which turn out to characterize the equilibrium in terms of whether (LLa)i s
binding for some type of a—agent.
W ei n t r o d u c es o m eu s e f u ln o t a t i o n .F o ra n yk, let
Pk = {l ∈ K | µPk(l) > 0} and Ak = {l ∈ K | µAk(l) > 0}
be the sets of types who are p—agents (resp. a-agents) of type k. Also, let
P = ∪k∈KPk and A = ∪k∈KAk
be the set of types who are p—agents and are a—agents of some type, respectively, and k0 =
inf A,t h ep o o r e s ta-agent (if A is nonempty). Finally, let
I = {k ∈ K | µI(k) > 0}
be the set of self-employed types, and let Ic be the complement of I, also referred to as the set
of active types.13 We use the notation (k,j)f o rt h em a t c hw h e r ek is the p-agent of j.W ea l s o
deﬁne µ(Ak)=
R
K µAk(j), and deﬁne similarly µ(Pk), µ(A), µ(P)a n dµ(I). Let 1 = minK
and K =m a xK without loss of generality.
As we look at economies with scarcity of capital, i.e.,
R
KWkµ(k) <C / 2, by (AM)w e
have µ(I) > 0. Some types have to be self-employed and provide their wealth to active (i.e.,
13The sets P, A and I can also be obtained as inverse image of (0,∞) through µ of appropriate measurable
subsets of D, and therefore are measurable.
14matched) types. If µ(A) = 0 equilibrium coincides with self-employment for every type, a ‘no
trade’ equilibrium. From (AM) then we obtain that r =1a n dX(1)−C+S(Wk,W k,W k,1) ≤ 0
for all k ∈ K. To rule out this case, we consider economies satisfying the following condition:
X(1) − C + S(Wk,W k,W k,1) > 0, some k ∈ K (P)
We are interested in two matching patterns, segregation and job specialization.
Deﬁnition 6 For an economy θ, an equilibrium <U ,µ ,r>displays segregation if k matches
with k0 only if k = k0. It displays job specialization if A ∩ P contains at most one atomic
type, and strict job specialization if A ∩ P = ∅. It displays monotonic job specialization if
I ∪ P = {k ∈ K | k ≤ k0} and A = {k ∈ K | k ≥ k0}.
When we have monotonic job specialization, there is a threshold type k0 separating indi-
viduals into two classes, homogeneous by occupation. Rich individuals choose the occupation
for which incentives are more important, while poorer individuals choose the occupation for
which incentives are less important, or stay idle (i.e., they become lenders). The interest rate
adjusts to make the marginal self-employed individual indiﬀerent between taking a job and
lending his wealth to others. The marginal type will be determined by ass e tm a r k e tc l e a r i n g ,
as a function of the whole distribution of wealth and of the setup cost. Let r(M)b et h e
equilibrium interest rate, where we stress the dependence of this rate of interest on the entire
distribution M.I ti si m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁned by the equation14





be the maximum possible value of r compatible with equilibrium, and solving (4). If r>r,
expected net beneﬁts from entering a ﬁrm would be negative. Throughout, we will maintain
that 2rW1 + X(1) − rC ≥ 0, all r ∈ [1,r], so that condition (F1) is satisﬁed at all matches
and all r. Incidentally, notice how this imposes restrictions on θ, and in particular on W1.
14Whether equation (4) has a solution will be proved in Proposition 4.
15Using Proposition 3, the (LLa) binds for k0 if and only if
U(k0) <g a(∆wg)( E ∗)
The preliminary fundamental properties of equilibrium can be established irrespective of the
value assumed by the interest rate. Asset market clearing only plays a role by forcing self-
employment in the economy for some individuals. Hence, the results obtained with an exoge-
nous interest rate apply (see [2], Lemma 2). We summarize these properties in the following
lemma, without proof.
Lemma 1 Assume condition (P). In any equilibrium,
a) (IR) binds in any match (j,k) for all j,k ∈ K, so that µ(A) >0,µ (P) > 0.
b) (LLp) does not bind in any match (j,k).
c) For all k ∈ A, and for all j ∈ I ∪ P,
rWk + X(1) − rC + S(Uk,W j,W k,r) − Uk = Uj − rWj =0≤ Uk − rWk . (5)
d) For all k,k0 ∈ K,i fk>k 0 then Uk − rWk ≥ Uk0 − rWk0.
e) If (E∗) holds, then there is monotonic job specialization.
Lemma 1.b is the key fact. If the reservation utility of a type who asks to be an a-agent were
set high enough for (LLp) to bind, individuals would switch to less expensive partners. Hence,
the wealth of the individual taking the p—agent job never matters in any match, realized or
not. This is due to the frictionless and competitive character of the matching market. Lemma
1.b together with Proposition 3 allows us to simplify notation and write the surplus in a match
(j,k)a sS(Uk).
From Lemma 1.b, we immediately obtain that the surplus in (5) does not depend on
Wk,W j or r. Since Uj = rWj for all j ∈ I, we must then have Uj = rWj for all j ∈ I ∪ P, as
Lemma 1.c states. Therefore, utility levels adjust to make the gain to a p—agent from hiring
a wealthier individual (due to more slack in the limited liability and incentive constraints)
exactly oﬀs e tb ya ni n c r e a s ei np a y o ﬀ claimed by this individual, and the interest rate is set
to equalize net payoﬀso fp—agents and self-employed types (i.e., pure lenders). Note that if
γ is deﬁned to be the common net payoﬀ to p—agents over the ﬁnancial market return, γ =0
in equilibrium: purchasing the riskfree asset or a p—agent has the same price in this economy.
Also note that we could describe the matching market in a simpliﬁed way as a competitive
market for one good, the p—agent job.
16The equilibrium matching pattern and payoﬀs depend on whether or not wealth matters
at all for the poorest individual taking up the a—agent job, as Lemma 1.e states. We now
translate Lemma 1.e into conditions on the primitives. The key observation is that matches
can achieve full surplus with a transfer −w(1) = [ga(∆wg)−gp(∆wg)−(X(1)−rC)]/2i ft h e
net payoﬀ is equalized across tasks, at least for one type. Therefore, for any r we let







be the set of unrestricted types, and let Rc(r)b ei t sc o m p l e m e n t .
When K = {k} = {1}, there is only one type and equilibrium always involves segregation or
self-employment. Production is an equilibrium if and only if U = rW1+ 1
2[X(1)−rC+S(U)],15
and 1
2[1 − rC + S(U)] ≥ 0, as is obvious. Then, we let K be thick, that is, contain at least
two types, or M is continuous.
Letting kmed be the median of the wealth distribution, deﬁne





as the median relative to the active population.N o t e t h a t 1 −
R
KWkµ(k)/C > 1/2a n d
k∗ >k med when
R
K Wkµ(k) < C
2. Moreover, k∗ depends on the entire distribution of wealth
M in the economy.
In what follows, we restrict attention to economies where some conditions on the primitives
hold, namely
X(1) − C + S(Wk,W k,W k,1) > 0f o ra l lk ∈ K (P∗)





Condition (P∗) is a strengthening of condition (P). We call productive the economies where
condition (P∗) holds, as then the measure of ﬁrms formed will be equal to the maximum
amount feasible, given the aggregate supply of capital. Condition (ND∗) is a nondegeneracy
condition only used in the necessity parts of our results, in order to simplify the exposition.
15Whether such an equation has a solution will be discussed in Proposition 4. Hence, existence of equilibria
for when K = {k} will also be established.
17Proposition 4 Suppose (P∗), (ND∗)h o l da n dK is thick. Then an equilibrium exists.
a) When k∗ ∈ Rc[r], the equilibrium is a.e. unique in utilities; the pattern of occupational
choice displays monotonic job specialization and k0 = k∗, r = r(M) < r; equilibrium utilities
satisfy γ = Uk0 − r(M)Wk0 =0 .
b) When k∗ ∈ R[r], (E∗)d o e sn o th o l d ;A ⊂ R(r),µ (P∩Rc(r)) > 0 and γ = Uk−rWk =0
for all k.




K Wkµ(k)/C;e q u i -
librium utilities satisfy Uk − rWk =0 for all k ∈ K. If there is an atom at k = K,t h e n
2WK − C>0 must also be true.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In words, Proposition 4 says that when the median relative to the active population k∗
is restricted, (LLa)b i n d sf o rt y p ek∗ and the only pattern of occupational choice consistent
with equilibrium is monotonic job specialization, where the threshold level k0 is k∗.T h i si sa
consequence of the fact that economies are productive, and that two jobs are needed for each
ﬁrm to be formed. If k∗ is unrestricted, monotonic job specialization is still consistent with
equilibrium provided that there are not suﬃciently many unrestricted types, but (LLa)d o e s
not bind for type k0.
The equilibrium proﬁle of utilities is uniquely determined and is obtained through ﬁnding
the segregation utility for k0, then setting γ = Uk0 − rWk0 a n du s i n g( 5 )a si nL e m m a1 . c ;r
is chosen to obtain γ =0b ys o l v i n g( 4 ) . 16
When condition (E∗)d o e sn o th o l d , and when there is excess supply of capital (see [2]),
essentially using Lemma 1.e one shows that segregation occurs if and only if K = R(1),
that is, if the limited liability constraints for the p-a n da-agents do not bind. Here things are
slightly complicated by the fact that there are self-employed types in the economy. Since asset
market clearing requires self-employment in equilibrium, conditions for segregation cannot be
distribution free. They depend on the proportion of unrestricted individuals relative to the
aggregate number of ﬁrms (1/2 of each unrestricted type must be numerous enough to form
the required number of ﬁrms).
16I nt h ek n i f e — e d g ec a s ew h e r e( ND∗) is violated, the equilibrium exists, but two cases arise. If K is ﬁnite,
provided that k∗ +1∈ Rc[r], (E∗)h o l d s , and there exist a continuum of possible equilibrium proﬁles, lying
b e w e e nt h eu n i q u ep r o ﬁles obtained by segregating k∗ or k∗ +1 . If k∗ +1∈ R[r], but k∗ ∈ Rc[r], the same
equilibrium pattern will emerge, with unequal division of surplus. If M is continuous at k∗, then this problem
disappears.
18In a segregation equilibrium the net payoﬀ is equalized across types. It is immediate
from (5) that since µ(I) > 0, segregation implies X(1) − rC + S(rWk)=0f o rk ∈ Ic, and
the economy is essentially at self-employment in a segregation equilibrium. The role of the
assumption 2WK − C>0i st or u l eo u tak n i f e - e d g ec a s ew h e r eIc = K, M has an atom
at k = K and segregation could occur while (LLa) is binding for the employed types, since
Lemma 1.e would not bite. A distinction between segregation and monotonic job specialization
is void unless there are at least two active types. Note that if the suﬃcient conditions in
Proposition 4.c are satisﬁed, the equilibrium is unique in utilities, although indeterminate
in matches, so that other matching conﬁgurations are compatible with equilibrium for these
economies, but they are all essentially segregated. Since ga(∆wg) − gp(∆wg)=0i fα =1 /2,
R(r)=K and all positive wealth levels are compatible with segregation, given that (F1)
implies rWk +( X(1) − rC)/2 > 0.
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Fig. 1: Equilibrium net payoﬀs with scarcity of capital.
In the graph, the equilibrium expected payoﬀs are represented for an economy with α =1 ,c=
1.1, C = X(1) = ∆X =1 . There are four wealth levels, corresponding to W1 = .18,W k = .1k
for k =2 ,3a n dW4 = .5; µ =( .14,.64,.11,.11), aggregate wealth is .2412, less than C/2, and
equal to the size of the industrial sector, or the active population. The median relative to the
active population is k∗ = 2. The equilibrium interest rate r(M)i s1 .4354.
195E ﬀects of redistributions
In this section, we extend the analysis of the eﬀects on equilibrium of changes in the wealth
distribution that was undertaken in Proposition 2. Proposition 4 shows that the force driving
the equilibrium distribution of net payoﬀs is the wealth level of the median class, as with
an exogenous interest rate, though now relative to the active population. When the median
is aﬀected, in general some types may beneﬁt from the change while others may lose. Here
we further characterize the welfare eﬀects of changes in the median relative to the active
population.
Let kj
∗ denote the median wealth of the active population before (j =1 )a n da f t e r( j =2 )
the change; let K+ = {k ∈ K | Wk − C ≥ 0}, and note that k1
∗ ∈ K\K+ by asset market
clearing.
Proposition 5 Let two economies θ1 and θ2 be given under Assumptions (P∗)a n d( N D ∗),
with Wk2
∗ <W k1
∗. There exists c W ∈ [Wk2
∗,W k1
∗] such that in equilibrium types with wealth
level less than c W have a (weakly) lower utility, and types with wealth greater than c W have a
(weakly) higher utility, unless they belong to K+. Any increase in the median corresponds to
the reverse eﬀect. The eﬀects are strict if condition (E∗) holds at k2
∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 allows comparisons across economies which may diﬀer in, or have the same,
aggregate wealth. When aggregate wealth is constant, changes in distribution can derive from
budget balanced redistributive policies.
Proposition 5 follows from equations (4) and (5). With scarcity of capital, changes in
wealth distribution yield utility changes essentially through a change in the interest rate, an
a s s e tm a r k e te ﬀect. Interest rate changes are proportional to median changes. All the lenders
[resp., borrowers] are aﬀected by a utility change [resp. inversely] proportional to the (median-
induced) change in the interest rate. Monotonic job specialization implies that poorer types
are always lenders, or a ‘trickle down’ eﬀect. As the interest rate changes, some types will
switch side in the asset market. For instance, if the median goes down, the interest decreases
and some lenders become borrowers. Those who switch and are below c W lose, the others gain.
Hence there are two interest groups in this economy, one made up of the middle class
above the median, and the other by the poor and the very rich. These interest groups are
nonmonotonic in wealth. Only if everyone has to borrow to form ﬁrms, i.e., K+ is empty, we
20have the same eﬀects as in [2]. Proposition 5 does not immediately say how to redistribute
wealth through budget balance tax reforms, i.e., what wealth classes to create through small















k∆Wk for k>k ∗,
(6)
if a tax reform has ∆Wk∗ > 0, it yields ∆Uk∗ > 0; if ∆Uk > 0f o rk ≥ k∗, then ∆Wk > 0f o r
all k ≥ k∗ with k ∈ A\K+, while by budget balance ∆Wk < 0f o rs o m ek<k ∗ or k ∈ K+.
In this case, a median increase is ﬁnanced by lenders to the advantage of borrowers. Another
median increasing policy could obtain welfare improvement for all those k ≤ k∗, by setting
∆Wk =0f o rk<k ∗ and taxing the middle class just above the median. Both policies could
satisfy more than 50% of the voters. However, even a median decreasing policy could also
rally more than 50% of the votes, depending on the initial wealth distribution.
More particularly, consider an anonymous and general interest redistributive policy that
taxes (or subsidizes) individuals at a rate τ of their wealth, and gives them a rebate G.
This kind of policy shares the features of those considered in [18], [17] and [12]: although
here we look at taxing wealth, the same distortionary aspects of income taxation carry over
in our context. By budget balance, G = τE(W), so that the after tax wealth is ˆ Wk =
(1 − τ)Wk + τE(W). In this case, a tax reform will have ∆ ˆ Wk = E(W) − Wk,a l lk.I t ’ sn o t
diﬃcult to see, using (6), that if Wk∗ ≤ E(W), the direction of redistribution is still dictated
by the preferences of the median. However, when Wk∗ >E (W), the median preferred outcome
(∆τ < 0) may not rally 50% of the votes in Downsian political competition over tax reforms.
While types with wealth Wk ∈ (E(W),W k∗]a n dt y p e sw i t hWk >Cwill dislike ∆τ > 0,
suﬃciently poor individuals may beneﬁtf r o mt a x e s ,as well as types with Wk ∈ (Wk,C).
Middle classes (i.e., the median k∗) do not always dictate the distributive programs chosen by
the political parties. This is again due to the capital market eﬀects of redistributions.
Proposition 5 is illustrated by the following example. Two economies are compared, with
diﬀerent wealth distributions. The basic parameters of the economies (α,c,X and C)a r ea s
in the economy of Fig. 1. Given these parameter values, S(U)=
p
2U/c− U in the relevant
range, and the maximum surplus is .4545, while the maximum possible interest rate r is 1.4545.
Type k =4h a sn o ww e a l t hW4 =1 .1. The aggregate (mean) wealth of the economies is ﬁxed
at .3072, equal to the size of the industrial sector, or the active population. In Economy 1,
21µ1 =( .25,.35,.30975,.09025), and k1
∗ =3 .I nE c o n o m y2 ,µ2 =( .14,.64,.11,.11) and k2
∗ =2 .
So, the median relative to the active population has decreased from Economy 1 to Economy
2. Straightforward calculations give the equilibrium utilities and interest rates in the two
economies, summarized in the following table:

















and Uk − rWk =0f o rk ≤ ki
∗, i =1 ,2, while U4 − rW4 = .00018 in Economy 1, and
U3 − rW3 = .01914 and U4 − rW4 = .01915 in Economy 2. The last column in the previous
table shows total surplus.
I nt h ee x a m p l e ,m o r ei n e q u a l i t yi nE c o n o m y2t h a ni nE c o n o m y1 ,a l s ow i t n e s s e db ya n
increase in the Gini coeﬃcient from .318 to .387, means a decrease in the median, and that
poorer people are worse oﬀ. Even under the assumptions of Proposition 5, there is no simple
relation between wealth inequality and welfare, unless K ≤ 3 and reducing the median implies
making the wealth distribution more unequal. In general, there is no relation between median
and inequality, measured through a mean preserving spread on µ.Am e a np r e s e r v i n gs p r e a d
may reduce or increase the median, so that raising or reducing inequality has no general
clear-cut eﬀect on the equilibrium. The same is true for the eﬀects of the median on total
surplus. This is a matter of the relative impact of the composition eﬀect (the size of diﬀerent
types in the population) and of the change-in-the-median eﬀect. However, total surplus can be
increased by changing the wealth only of types k>k ∗. This can be done by a redistributive
policy that brings more equality among the a-agents above k∗,u s i n gt h ec o n c a v i t yi nWk of
Uk − rWk (or Uk − Wk)f o rk>k ∗, and Rothschild and Stiglitz [19], as explained in [2].
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Pick any constrained eﬃcient bargaining procedure B and an associated equilibrium, <U ∗,µ ∗,r ∗ >.
Consider an alternative constrained eﬃcient bargaining procedure B0, for each pair k0,k,s t a r t i n ga tU∗,r ∗.
Consider the feasible set F(W,U ∗,r ∗), with (U∗
p,U∗

















for all k,k0 with µ∗





k); or, because (U0
p,U0





k). Nothing changes for pairs (k0,k) where µ∗
k(Ak0)=0 .T o c o n c l u d e , <
U∗,µ ∗,r ∗ > must also be an equilibrium (that is, satisﬁes conditions (i)-(iii) in Deﬁnition 2) when the
bargaining procedure is B0. This shows also that the equilibrium outcome is identical for all constrained
eﬃcient bargaining procedures B.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Let <U ∗,µ ∗,r ∗ > be an equilibrium for the given economy θ, and suppose that it is not constrained
optimal. Then there is a transfer policy τ, an allocation µ0 and an interest rate r0, feasible for θτ such that
U(µ0,r 0) dominates U∗.
The transfer policy τ assigns transfer τ(ik) to each individual ik, all k ∈ K. Since economies have
a compact set of types, the image of τ is a compact set T = {τ1,...,τJ}. Let µ(k,τ) be the measure of
individualsik receiving transferτ ∈ T, where
R
T µ(k,τ)=µ(k). For any individualik,l e tWk,τ = Wk+τ




Tτµ(k,τ)=0 , where the equality states that total wealth is unchanged.
If ik is self-employed under µ0, then r0Wk,τ ≥ r∗Wk, with strict inequality if Uik(µ0,r 0) >U ∗
k.F o r
any match (ik,i k0) under µ0,w h e r eik and ik0 have received transfers τ and τ0 respectively, we must have
r∗(Wk+Wk0 −C) ≤ r0(Wk,τ +Wk0,τ0 −C). To see this, recall from our discussion of expression (1) that,
up to relabeling, only the total wealth of the ﬁrm matters for contracts. Suppose that the previous inequality
















where both sets are nonempty, or we are done. Letw0,e 0
a,e 0
p be the contract that generatesUik(µ0,r 0),U ik0(µ0,r 0).
Using the same contract, from the deﬁnition of ua,u p and again relabeling if necessary, there exists b U ∈
F(Wk,W k0,U∗
k,U∗
k0,r ∗) with b Up >U ik(µ0,r 0) ≥ U∗
k and b Ua ≥ Uik0(µ0,r 0) ≥ U∗
k0, a contradiction with
the constrained eﬃciency of B. Following the same logic, if Uik(µ0,r 0) >U ∗
k or Uik0(µ0,r 0) >U ∗
k0,t h e n
r∗(Wk + Wk0 − C) <r 0(Wk,τ + Wk0,τ0 − C).
Then, using the feasibility of µ0, the deﬁnition of µ(k,τ), and obvious notation, and summing over all
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C , we have a contradiction, using (AM).I fn o t ,r0 =1 , then r∗ ≥ 1,
and (r∗ −1)Wk ≤ τ if ik is self-employed under µ0 and receives τ, while r∗(Wk +Wk0 −C) ≤ τ0 +τ00
if (ik,i k0) match under µ0, and receive transfers τ0,τ00, again with strict inequalities if utilities are strictly
higher than in equilibrium. But then
R




T τµ(k,τ)=0 , a contradiction.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Since
R
K Wkµ(k) < C
2, from (AM) we obtain that r>1. For if r =1 , then by condition (P∗), any
j ∈ I w o u l ds t r i c t l yp r e f e rm a t c h i n gw i t hi t so w nt y p ea sap—agent to self—employment. Therefore, in this
case (AM) must hold with equality.
(a) We show that k∗ ∈ Rc[r] implies (E∗). If not, an equilibrium where (E∗) does not hold must
obtain, and then Uk ≥ ga(∆wg) for all k ∈ A, so that from (5), we obtain that there exist constants
γa,γ ≥ 0 such that
Uk − rWk = γafor all k ∈ A
Uj − rWj = γfor all j ∈ P
with γa ≥ γ and
γa + γ = X(1) − rC + g(∆wg) ≥ 0
Notice that γ =0since µ(I) > 0. If γa > γ, then A ∩ P = ∅. By market clearing (AM),k 0 ≤ k∗.
If k0 <k ∗, using Lemma 1.d, k ∈ A for all k ≥ k0, again contradicting market clearing; otherwise, by
(ND∗) and (AM), µ(A ∩ P) > 0, hence A ∩ P 6= ∅, a contradiction. If γa = γ =0 , then again we
contradict k∗ ∈ Rc[r].
Now, by Lemma 1.e, (AM) is
Z
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Since M(k∗) > 1 −
R
K Wkµ(k)















Kµk0(Aj) > 0 and min[
R
K µk0(Pj),µ k0(I)] > 0. From (5) in Lemma 1.c, we must have for
all j<k 0 and all k>k 0,
Uj − rWj = Uk0 − rWk0 = γ =0 ( 1 )
0=rWk + X(1) − rC + S(Uk,W j,W k,r) − Uk (2)
(7)
Since k0 = k∗, using (7.1) in (7.2) when k = j = k∗, we obtain equation (4) as
X(1) − rC + S(rWk∗,W k∗,W k∗,r)=0 ( 8 )
Hence, r = r(M) and from (E∗) and (7.1) we must then have r(M)Wk∗ <g a(∆wg). Notice that this
is consistent with k∗ ∈ Rc[r]. F o ri fn o t ,u s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of R[r] we would have rWk∗ ≥ ga(∆wg).
Then using rWk∗ as utility level, r(M)=r, violating r(M)Wk∗ <g a(∆wg).
To show that (8) has a solution, let
ψ(r) ≡ X(1) − rC + S(rWk∗,W k∗,W k∗,r)
We observe that ψ is continuous, ψ(r) ≤ 0 by (F1), positive expected maximum surplus and the deﬁnition
of r.A l s o , ψ(1) > 0 by property (P∗). By the Intermediate Value Theorem a solution to (7.2) when
k = j = k∗ exists for r in the range (1,r], and is unique by the properties of the surplus function as in
Proposition 3. Hence r(M) is well deﬁned if k0 = k∗.
Consider system (7) when k0 = k∗. That is, letting Uk = rWk for all k ≤ k∗, equation (7.2) when
k = j = k∗ is solved for r by r(M) < r. Given a solution to (7.2) when k = j = k∗, a solution to (7.1)
and (7.2) also exists for all k>k ∗ and all j<k ∗ using the same logic as to solve (4), and is unique by
Proposition 3.
The proﬁle of utilities and r so obtained is an equilibrium with I ∪ P ={k ∈ K|k ≤ k∗}, A ={k ∈
K|k ≥ k∗} as a feasible allocation µ can be found. If M is not continuous, we match types (for instance, but
not necessarily) in a positive assortative way, until all k>k ∗,i nm e a s u r e1 − M(k∗) <
R
KWkµ(k)/C,
are assigned as a-agents to types below k∗. The process will stop in ﬁnite time. We then choose µk∗(Ak∗),
µk∗(I) to satisfy feasibility for k∗ and asset market clearing (AM) (two equations in two unknowns). Notice




Wkµ(k) − (C/2)(1 − µk∗(I)).
Clearly ϕ is continuous, ϕ(0) < 0 and ϕ(µ(k∗)) > 0, so that by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is
µk∗(I) ∈ (0,µ(k∗)) with ϕ(µk∗(I)) = 0. Now we choose µk∗(Ak∗) to satisfy feasibility for k∗.
25Otherwise, let µI|K∗ and µ|K∗ be µI(k) and µ(k) restricted to K∗ = {k ∈ K|k ≤ k∗} as domain.








Clearly again, ϕ(0) < 0 and ϕ(µ|K∗) > 0. Consider the subspace C(R(r),[0,1]) of continuous
functions 0 ≤ µI|K∗ ≤ µ|K∗ with any topology for which summation and scalar multiplication of these
functions are continuous. Since the convex combination of any two elements of this space is still in the
space, it is connected, and the function ϕ continuous as it is the Lebesgue integral of µI|K∗. Again by the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists µI|K∗ such that the asset market clears. Then we proceed by
assigning
R
j≤k∗ µk(Aj)=µ(k) for k>k ∗ to the measure M(k∗) −
R
K∗ µI(k) of types k ≤ k∗.
(b) Suppose that k∗ ∈ R[r]. If k0 ∈ Rc[r],t h e nk0 <k ∗,a n d(E∗) holds, but using part (a),
k∗ ∈ Rc[r], a contradiction. So k0 ∈ R[r], and A ⊂ R[r].S e t t i n g r = r and Uk = rWk for all k,





K Wkµ(k), so that µk(I) < µ(k) for some k ∈ Rc[r], and P ∩ Rc[r] 6= ∅.
(c) First, we show necessity. For segregation to be an equilibrium, given Lemma 1.b and from (5) in
Lemma 1.c, we have
Uk0 − rWk
0 = Uk − rWk = γ =[ X(1) − rC + S(Uk)]/2 for all k,k
0 ∈ K. (9)
and X(1) − rC + S(rWk,W k,W k,r) ≤ 0 if k ∈ I. Obviously, for the self-employed types k ∈ I, we
have Uk = rWk, so that r = r and γ =0 .
Next, we show that in any segregation equilibrium the (LLa) cannot bind.
First, assume that Ic is a single atom, and suppose it does. Since Ic = {k0}, then X(1) − rC +
S(rWk0)=0and r<r,w h i l eX(1) − rC + S(rWk,W k,W k,r) ≤ 0 for k ∈ I. If k>k 0 the (LLp)
must bind in a (k,k) match; for if not, X(1) − rC + S(rWk) >X (1) − rC + S(rWk0)=0and the
p—agent in such a match gets rWk + X(1) − rC + S(rWk) >U k, a contradiction. But as Lemma 1.b
established that (LLp) cannot bind in any match of any equilibrium, it must be that k0 = K, M has an




implying 2WK − C<0, a contradiction establishing that the (LLa) cannot bind at any segregation
equilibrium with Ic = {K}.
26When Ic is thick, in any segregation equilibrium the (LLa) cannot bind, simply as a converse to Lemma
1.e.
Since ﬁrms operate at full surplus g(∆wg) and r = r, A ⊂ R(r) follows immediately. Moreover,
we have that µ(k,I)=µ(k) for k ∈ Rc(r). To see this, observe that given r,Uk = rWk and any
k ∈ R(r) will be indiﬀerent between forming a ﬁrm with k0 ∈ R(r) or staying self—employed. Being
p—agent of any k0 ∈ R(r)c cannot yield g, hence any k ∈ R(r) would get an expected net payoﬀ of
X(1) − rC +S(rWk0,W k,W k0,r) < 0 for k0 ∈ R(r)c. The same reasoning shows that any k ∈ R(r)c
can either be self-employed or forming a ﬁrm with any k0 ∈ R(r).B y s e g r e g a t i o n , µI(k)=µ(k) for














KWkµ(k),t h e ne ϕ(0) > 0, and a fortiori e ϕ(µI|R(r)) > 0 for all µI|R(r) > 0 on a





For suﬃciency, we construct a segregation equilibrium as follows: given r = r, k ∈ R(r) implies that
these types can form wealth-homogeneous ﬁrms at maximum surplus. Let Uk = rWk for all k ∈ K.A sw e
showed for necessity, at r,U, segregation is consistent with optimization, and then we have µ(k,I)=µk for
k ∈ Rc(r), while Ic ⊂ R(r). The only issue remaining is asset market clearing, determining the number
of ﬁrms formed in equilibrium. We need to ﬁnd a solution to e ϕ(µI|R(r))=0 , one equation in the unknown




KWkµ(k), then e ϕ(0) ≤ 0, while e ϕ(µ|R(r)) > 0.I fK is
ﬁnite, µI|R(r),µ|R(r) are vectors; now, e ϕ is continuous and [0,µ|R(r)] is connected, so by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists µI|R(r) such that the asset market clears. When M is continuous, we consider the
subspace C(R(r),[0,1]) of continuous functions 0 ≤ µI|R(r) ≤ µ|R(r) and proceed with the Intermediate
Value Theorem as in part (a). Then segregation is an equilibrium with A ⊂ R(r) nonempty.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5





∗, while there is aggregate scarcity of capital, and α,C are the same. Denote by r1,r 2








≥ 0( 1 0 )
27since C − Wk∗ > 0 (we let S0
∗ ≡ S0(rWk∗)). Then, r0(W) ≥ 0 for W ∈ [Wk2
∗,W k1
∗],a n dr2 ≤ r1.
Since γ1 = γ2 =0 , U2
k ≤ U1
k for Wk ≤ Wk2
∗.A sf o rWk >W k2
∗,l e t t i n gS0
k ≡ S0(Uk), if Wk ≥ Wk1
∗







(whether or not k is in the support of both θ1 and θ2). If Wk is such that k ∈ A1\K+, Wk −C<0,a n d
U2
k ≥ U1
k, and notice that Wk1




k. If Wk ∈ [Wk2
∗,W k1
∗], the diﬀerence U2
k − U1
k is given by φ(Wk,r 2) − r1W,w h e r e
φ(Wk,r 2) is the solution to (5). At Wk = Wk2
∗, U2
k − U1
k ≤ 0, while at Wk = Wk1
∗ the diﬀerence is
nonnegative. Hence, the Intermediate Value Theorem gives the existence of a W ∈ [Wk2
∗,W k1
∗], as required.
Strict inequalities hold if k2
∗ ∈ Rc(r).
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